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 Regulation is purportedly enacted to serve specific social purposes.  In reality, however, it follows 
a more complex political economy process, where legitimate social goals are mixed with the 
objectives of particular interest groups.  Whatever its justification and objectives, regulation can 
have potentially significant macroeconomic consequences, by helping or hampering the dynamics 
of economic restructuring and resource reallocation that underlie the growth process.  This paper 
provides an empirical analysis of the macroeconomic impact of regulation.  It first characterizes the 
stylized facts on regulation across the world, using a set of newly constructed, comprehensive 
indicators of regulation in a large number of countries in the 1990s.  Using these indicators, the 
paper studies the effects of regulation on economic growth and macroeconomic volatility 
employing cross-country regression analysis.  In particular, the paper considers whether the effects 
of regulation are affected by the country's level of institutional development.  Finally, the analysis 
controls for the likely endogeneity of regulation with respect to macroeconomic performance.  The 
paper concludes that a heavier regulatory burden reduces growth and increases volatility, although 
these effects are smaller the higher the quality of the overall institutional framework. 
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I.  Introduction 
Regulation of goods and f actor markets is purportedly enacted to serve specific 
social purposes.  In reality, however, it obeys a more complex political economy process, 
where legitimate social goals are mixed with the objectives of particular interest groups 
concerning the level and distribution of rents.  But regulation also has potentially important 
effects on economic performance, which have attracted increasing attention in recent years.  
According to a commonly held view, excessive regulation is the prime cause of Europe’s 
macroeconomic underperformance over the last decade vis-à-vis the United States (see 
Blanchard 2004).  Likewise, intricate regulation and its arbitrary enforcement are listed by 
the World Bank (2005) among the key obstacles to growth in developing countries.   
The key mechanism through which regulation affects aggregate economic 
performance is the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction” at the core of the 
growth engine in market economies -- the continuous restructuring and factor reallocation 
through which new technologies replace the old (Aghion and Howitt 1992, Caballero and 
Hammour 1996).  There is ample evidence that the shift of resources away from less 
productive and towards more efficient production units accounts for much of the observed 
growth in aggregate productivity.
1  The macroeconomic impact of regulation arises 
primarily from its effects on the dynamics of restructuring.
2   In particular, regulatory 
barriers that disrupt the process of resource reallocation tend to cause a deterioration  in 
aggregate economic performance, by allowing low-productivity activities to survive too 
long, and discouraging the adoption of new high-productivity activities (Caballero and 
Hammour 1998).   
A recent empirical literature has examined the impact of various kinds of regulation 
on proximate determinants of GDP growth – productivity, investment and employment – 
finding for the most part negative effects.  In this vein, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find 
that product market regulation lowers multifactor productivity growth in OECD countries, 
while Bassanini and Ernst (2002) report a negative effect of regulation on innovation.  
Alesina et al. (2002) likewise find that product market regulations have a negative effect 
                                                 
1 See for example Haltiwanger (2000) and Ahn (2001). 
2 For theoretical linkages between regulation and firm dynamics see, for instance, Pakes and McGuire 
(1994), Hopenhayn (1992) and Bergoeing et al., (2004).  See also Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) for an 
insightful model highlighting the macroeconomics of labor and product market regulation.   3
on private investment in OECD economies.  In turn, Nicoletti et al. (2001a,b) provide 
empirical evidence that anti-competitive regulation reduces employment in a panel of 
industrial countries, while CEPR-IFS (2003) find that increased product market 
competition encouraged by deregulation raises both investment and employment in a panel 
data set covering OECD countries.
3  Regarding labor regulation Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000) and Heckman and Pagés (2000) find that hiring and firing restrictions discourage 
employment creation in European and Latin A merican economies, respectively.  
Moreover, simulations for OECD economies suggest that the effects of output and labor 
regulation on aggregate investment and employment are quantitatively considerable 
(Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti 2004). 
A few empirical studies tackle the impact of regulation and deregulation on 
aggregate growth in a cross-country setting.  Koedijk and Kremers (1996) find a negative 
association between measures of product market regulation and GDP growth among 11 
European countries.  In contrast, they find that labor regulations have no significant 
association with growth performance.  Dutz and Hairy (1999) apply extreme-bounds 
analysis to estimate the contribution to growth of a variety of (mostly subjective) 
regulation and competition indicators in a sample of industrial and developing countries.  
They find significant effects of measures of anti-trust policy and the average age of large 
firms (taken as proxy for entry and exit barriers).  However, Card and Freeman (2002) fail 
to find any significant association between subjective measures of economic regulation and 
growth performance in a panel regression covering OECD countries over 1970-99. 
In this paper we present a comprehensive empirical assessment of the 
macroeconomic effects of regulation in a large sample of industrial and developing 
countries.  We focus on two key measures of macroeconomic performance, namely the 
growth and volatility of real GDP.  Our empirical strategy relies on the inclusion of 
suitable indicators of regulation into simple empirical equations relating these aggregate 
performance measures to standard control variables taken from the macroeconomics and 
growth literature.  While we do not characterize the specific channel through which the 
                                                 
3 In contrast, CEPR-IFS (2003) finds that the impact of product market competition on aggregate 
productivity growth is less robust: the effect is positive only when the cross-country variation is taken into 
consideration, and negative when the estimates are computed using the within-country variation.     4
aggregate impact of regulation unfolds, our approach allows us to obtain a summary 
measure of the magnitude of such impact which combines the action of the various 
intervening mechanisms  – factor reallocation, capital accumulation, competition and 
innovation – considered in the literature.  
The paper extends the literature along four dimensions.  First, we provide a broad 
characterization of business regulation around the world.  Drawing from a variety of data 
sources, we build a set of synthetic indicators capturing the regulations that firms face in 
the multiple dimensions of their activity  – entry and exit, trade, taxes, contract 
enforcement, labor and finance.  One novel feature of these indicators is that they go 
beyond de jure regulation and incorporate, to a significant extent, the burden of de facto 
regulation.  Using this information, we document the stylized facts of regulation across the 
world, regarding the extent of regulation in different countries, its relation with per capita 
income, and the observed relationship between different types of regulation. 
Second, unlike the existing literature on the macroeconomic impact of regulation, 
which has focused almost exclusively on aggregate growth or its proximate determinants, 
we examine also the effect of regulation on aggregate volatility.  This is of independent 
interest for several reasons.  On the one hand, recent literature suggests that excessive 
regulation can lead to microeconomic inflexibility (Caballero, Engel and Micco 2004).  
This tends to hamper the economy’s ability to absorb shocks requiring microeconomic 
reallocation, thus amplifying their aggregate impact.  On the other hand, certain kinds of 
product market regulation  – such as those on entry and exit – act as barriers to firm 
creation and destruction and might have the opposite effect, attenuating cyclical output 
fluctuations.  Hence, the impact of regulation on volatility is a priori ambiguous, and can 
be established only empirically.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper addressing this 
issue. 
Third, we take into account the fact that the effects of regulation are likely to 
depend not only on the quantity of regulation, but also on its quality.  There are good 
reasons for this.  On analytical grounds, certain types of regulation  – such as those 
designed to enhance competition in goods or financial markets – should be expected to   5
exert beneficial effects on economic performance, rather than adverse ones.
4    More 
generally, countries with better institutions tend to create regulatory environments 
genuinely aimed to improve business conditions rather than privilege a few interest groups.  
They are also more likely to enforce regulation in a transparent and even-handed manner, 
limiting the regulator’s margin for arbitrariness and corruption that can place many firms at 
a disadvantage, sometimes forcing them to operate in the informal sector.
5  All these 
arguments suggest that the quality of regulation is likely to be closely related to overall 
governance quality, and thus in our experiments we use standard governance indicators to 
capture regulatory quality. 
Fourth, our empirical approach also allows for the possibility that aggregate 
performance may itself be one of the factors weighing on policy makers’ decision to adopt 
regulatory measures.  Low growth or excessive macroeconomic volatility may make it 
more likely for the authorities to introduce or tighten regulation – e.g., adopting strict labor 
regulations or raising firm exit barriers in the hope of containing job and output losses in 
downswings.  Thus, any observed association between regulation and macroeconomic 
performance could reflect causality from the latter to the former rather than (or in addition 
to) the reverse.  To ensure that our results reflect the causal effect of regulations on growth 
and volatility, we also report empirical results from instrumental variable estimations. 
Before proceeding, we should note one important caveat of our analysis.  Our 
objective is limited to studying the macroeconomic consequences of regulation.  It is not 
our purpose  to evaluate the success of specific regulations at meeting their stated 
objectives, nor do we pretend to judge the impact of regulation on social welfare 
dimensions beyond the influence of economic growth and volatility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the synthetic 
regulation indicators and presents some stylized facts concerning the patterns of regulation 
across industrial and developing countries.  Section III reports estimates of the impact of 
regulation on growth and aggregate volatility.  Section IV offers some concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, Klapper et al. (2004) find that certain regulations, such as entry and exit barriers, have 
negative effects on firm entry, whereas others, like investors’ rights regulations, have positive effects. 
5 See for instance De Soto (1986).   6
II. Business regulation around the world 
We now turn to the description of the nature and extent of business regulation 
around the world.  In this section, we first give an account of the areas of economic activity 
under regulation on which we focus and describe how we measure regulation in each of 
them.  Next, we discuss differences in regulation intensity across regions of the world and 
give a preview of the relationship between regulation and macroeconomic variables. 
A typology of regulation 
Our departure point is the assumption that the macroeconomic impact of business 
regulation arises from its effects on firm dynamics.  Therefore, we select the relevant areas 
of business regulation by looking for them at the three stages of the life of a firm: entry, 
growth, and exit.  In most countries, all three are regulated to some degree; for instance, in 
virtually all countries entrepreneurs need to follow a number of procedures to start a firm, 
although the burden of the administrative process varies widely across countries.
6  Once a 
firm is legally registered and allowed to operate, its decisions are conditioned by 
regulations on hiring and firing workers, taxes, safety standards, environmental 
regulations, i nterest rate controls, trade barriers, legal procedures, etc.
7 Finally, a firm 
going out of business must again follow a sometimes costly and lengthy procedure. 
How does regulation alter firm dynamics? 
Regulation certainly affects firms’ decisions, but does it improve the conditions for 
their activities or, on the contrary, does it impose unnecessary restrictions that increase 
costs and reduce productivity? Although we do not rule out the first option, we should 
recognize the potentially distortive effects of regulation on firms’ decisions and ultimately 
on macro performance.  We consider seven main areas of a firm’s activity subject to 
regulation: entry, exit, labor markets, fiscal burden, international trade, financial markets, 
and contract e nforcement; for each area, we construct an index of the severity of 
regulation.  Rather than restricting our measures of regulation strictly to legal directives, 
we want to account for the practical restrictions and complications brought about by 
certain rules.  The regulation of entry index aims at capturing the actual difficulty that an 
                                                 
6 See Djankov et al. (2002). 
7 Some regulations have also “indirect” effects on firm dynamics, for instance, Berkowitz and White (2002) 
find that personal bankruptcy laws play an important role in small firms’ access to credit in the U.S.   7
entrepreneur faces to start a business, from a legal perspective as well as in practice.  The 
index of bankruptcy regulation should reflect the speed and efficiency of the bankruptcy 
process; in particular how well the justice system establishes priorities for creditors and 
enforces compensation.  With the labor market regulation index, we want to measure how 
difficult it is for a firm to adjust its labor force.  The measure should also include 
information about the wage setting system of the country, and the power of organized 
labor.  The index of fiscal burden aims at measuring the burden to firms imposed by 
taxation and fiscal spending, an element that determines in many cases a firm’s choice of 
location.  With the trade regulation index we look at how much countries protect domestic 
producers; specifically we are interested in measuring the cost for the entire economy of 
protecting a selected group of producers.  The financial markets regulation index should 
capture how easy a firm’s access to capital markets is.  For instance, special credit 
conditions for some industries, or interest rate controls can reduce the availability of credit 
to more deserving firms and distort  incentives for investment.  Finally, the contract 
enforcement index is a general measure of how easily firms can turn to the justice system 
to resolve legal disputes. 
Measuring regulation 
We use six data sources for the construction of our indices: Doing Business (The 
World Bank Group), Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), Economic 
Freedom of the World (The Fraser Institute), Labor Market Indicators Database (M. Rama 
and R. Artecona, 2000), The Corporate Tax Rates Survey (KPMG), and I nternational 
Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group).  These sources cover the largest number of 
countries and areas under regulation, and their measures use a clear methodology and are 
straightforward.  Except for the Labor Market Indicators Database, all sources are public.  
Our sample covers 76 countries.
8 
In most cases, data are based on surveys conducted in a single year (in the late 
1990’s) in a large group of countries; for components with observations for more than one 
                                                 
8 We do not consider here the heterogeneity of regulation within countries.  This can be important in some 
cases, such as the added burden of local taxation in federal systems.  At present, however, very few data 
sources provide information on regulation at the regional level.  One of these sources is the Investment 
Climate Survey of The World Bank, which records data on investment climate and activities of over 14,000 
firms in about 30 countries.   8
year, we use average values over the period.  Therefore, our indices should be interpreted 
as average regulation levels in the late 1990’s.  We should note, however, that regulation 
tends to stay constant over long periods of time.
9 
Each index measures the intensity of the regulatory system on a scale from 0 to 1 (1 
representing the heaviest regulation).  In order to be able to combine all components, we 














, if lower values of X indicate heavier regulation 
We then obtain an index of regulation for each area of business activity outlined 
above by matching each component to one activity, and taking the simple average of the 
components within each activity. 
The entry regulation index combines the number of legal steps required to register 
a new business with an indicator of the overall legal burden of registration and willingness 
of the government to facilitate the process and intervene minimally.  The index of labor 
regulation  combines the percentage of workers that belong to a union, the minimum 
mandatory working conditions, and the degree of hiring and firing flexibility granted by 
the law.  The index of fiscal burden measures direct taxation --that is, the maximum tax 
rate applied to individuals and businesses-- and fiscal spending.  The index of  trade 
barriers combines an indicator of average tariffs with one that measures the existence of 
hidden import barriers, and an indicator of the additional cost of importing generated by 
mandatory administrative procedures (tariff costs, fees for obtaining licenses, bank fees, 
etc.).  The index of  financial markets regulation measures the degree of government 
intervention in the financial market, interest rate controls, ownership of banks, entry 
barriers, restrictions in securities markets, and competition between domestic and foreign 
banks.  The index of contract enforcement combines the number of legal procedures for 
disputes that are taken to court, with a measure of the stability of the bureaucracy and its 
sensitivity to political changes in the government.  Finally, the index of  bankruptcy 
regulation measures the efficiency of the bankruptcy process by combining the time and 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Bolaky and Freund (2004).   9
cost of insolvency, the enforcement of priority of claims, the extent to which the efficient 
outcome is achieved, and the degree of court involvement in the process. 
Rather than just summarize de jure regulation, our measures capture to a large 
extent its actual burden on economic agents. However, a caveat is necessary: our indices, 
as well as their components, do not provide full information about the quality of 
regulation; in particular, they do not reflect completely either the extent to which 
regulation corrects for market  failures or the political and social context in which 
regulation is implemented.  These distinctions are important because, as already noted, the 
economic impact of regulation may be dependent on institutional country characteristics.
10  
We attempt to account for this issue in the econometric section of the paper. 
Regulation around the world 
How do entry, growth and exit regulations vary across world regions? Although 
governments oversee and extract revenues from business activities in all countries --and 
quite heavily in many--, there is considerable variation in the intensity of regulation across 
regions.  Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the seven indices mentioned above.  
Industrial countries tend to adopt heavy fiscal regulation, medium labor regulation, and 
low regulation in trade, financial markets, entry, bankruptcy, and contract enforcement.  
Developing regions cannot be characterized as simply as the OECD as they show varying 
patterns for each type of regulation.    For example, with respect to the OECD, labor 
regulation is almost 16% lower in East Asia and the Pacific, while 26% higher in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
11  The most striking difference between the OECD and 
developing-country groups is in trade regulation, where all developing regions have 
indices at least 150% higher than the OECD group, reaching an enormous 710% difference 
in the case of the Middle East and Northern Africa.  On the other hand, in the case of fiscal 
regulation, differences across regions are not nearly as pronounced. 
Which countries regulate the most? Although heavy regulators are mainly found 
among developing countries, OECD countries rank highest in fiscal regulation: Belgium 
ranks number one, Italy number two, and France is number four (Syria is number three).  
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Claessens and Klapper (2002). 
11 These numbers are calculated on the basis of Table 1, for example, the mean of the “Labor” indicator is 
0.44 in the OECD and 0.37 in the EAP region, so that the difference is (0.37-0.44)*100/0.44 = -15.9%.   10
The country with the lowest fiscal-regulation score is Haiti.
12  On average, labor regulation 
is highest in Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by the Middle East and Northern 
Africa.  OECD countries do not have high labor regulation in average, but they do exhibit 
large dispersion: over the entire sample (all regions combined), Portugal has the highest 
labor regulation score while the United States has the lowest.  In the remaining areas 
OECD countries always occupy the bottom of the distribution.  For instance, The 
Netherlands reaches the lowest score in financial regulation, Finland in bankruptcy and 
trade, Iceland in contract enforcement, and Canada in entry regulation.  The harshest 
regulatory environments are in Sierra Leone (contract enforcement), Haiti (entry), Syria 
and Iran (financial markets), Tunisia and Papua New Guinea (trade), and The Philippines 
(bankruptcy). 
Table 2 shows simple correlations between the regulation indices.  The strongly 
positive correlations among all but the fiscal burden and labor indices suggest that 
regulation policy comes in “packages.”  Judging from these correlations, we can 
distinguish three regulation categories: fiscal burden, labor, and “product market,” where 
the latter is a composite of the entry, trade, financial markets, bankruptcy, and contract 
enforcement indices.
13  We obtain the product market index by averaging the scores of the 
five components; we also compute an “overall” regulation index by averaging the scores of 
all seven components.  We choose to give equal weights to all components despite the 
strong correlation among the first five because we don’t have any priors about the 
importance of labor market or fiscal regulation relative to the others.   
The arrangement of the regulation indices into these three groups receives 
additional statistical support from factor analysis.  The first three principal components 
obtained from factor analysis of the seven basic indices explain, respectively, 53%, 15%, 
and 12% of their overall variance.  These principal components have a close one-to-one 
match with the indices resulting from the three categories.  For the first principal 
component, the five “product market” regulation indices receive high and similar loadings, 
and not so the labor and fiscal regulation indices.  For the second principal component, the 
                                                 
12 Keep in mind that the rank of a country is relative to the sample, therefore changing the composition of the 
sample will most likely alter the ranking as well. 
13 The term “product market regulations” is taken from Nicoletti et al. (2000).   11
labor regulation index receives the highest loading, while the other six indices get only low 
positive or negative weights.  Analogously, the third principal component loads heavily 
only on the tax regulation index.  The close connection between the principal components 
and our regulation categories is clearly demonstrated by the pattern of correlation 
coefficients shown in Table 2.
14 
Figure 1 provides a regional comparison of the overall, product market, fiscal, and 
labor regulation indices.  In addition, figure 2 depicts scatter plots of these indices against 
the (the log of) GDP per capita of all countries in the sample.  Looking at the first three 
panels, it becomes clear that employment regulation, fiscal burden, and product market 
regulation stand apart from each other.  Indeed, while there seems to be little relation 
between a country’s average income and the strength of labor regulation, the relationship 
with income is positive and significant in the case of fiscal burden and clearly negative in 
the case of product market regulation.  The overall regulation index is negatively related to 
per capita GDP, which is not surprising given the large weight of product market 
regulation in the overall index. 
Regulation and governance 
The effect of regulation on firm dynamics and, ultimately, macroeconomic 
performance is likely to depend on the institutional context in which regulation is enacted.  
For example, countries with better institutions create regulatory environments that actually 
try to improve business conditions rather than privilege a few interest groups; they also 
limit the interaction between regulation and abuses of power in the public sector that place 
many firms in disadvantage, sometimes forcing them to operate in the informal sector (see 
for instance De Soto, 1986). 
We use an index of “governance quality” in order to assess the quality of regulation 
itself and the general context that determines how regulation functions.  We construct this 
index using measures from the International Country Risk Guide, which evaluates a 
country’s risk for international investment by looking at its social and political situation.  
Specifically, we average the values of indicators measuring the absence of corruption in 
                                                 
14 Other studies, such as Nicoletti et al. (2000) or Klapper et al. (2004) also use factor analysis to decompose 
regulation measures, and they further replace the measures with their principal components in the 
regressions.  Because of the strong correlation between the components and our indices (see Table 2), we 
choose not to use the principal components in our regressions.   12




III.  Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance 
Having described how the regulatory environment varies across countries, our 
objective for this section is examining whether regulations have an impact on 
macroeconomic performance.  Regulations are imposed for a variety of reasons.  
Officially, they are enacted to serve specific social purposes, from consumer health safety 
to the protection of domestic e mployment.  In reality, however, the imposition of 
regulation follows a more complex political economy process, where legitimate social 
goals are mixed with the objectives of particular interest groups (see Djankov, La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).  Whatever their justifications and objectives, 
regulations are likely to have an impact beyond their area of control.  Here we examine 
whether they have an aggregate effect, specifically on economic growth and volatility.  
Together these variables  provide a comprehensive, yet succinct, evaluation of 
macroeconomic performance. 
In assessing the effect of the regulatory environment, it is important to consider that 
the quality of regulation is profoundly affected by the institutional context in which i t is 
imposed.  Thus, the ultimate impact that regulation may have on macroeconomic 
performance is likely to be affected by the country’s level of institutional development.  In 
order to explore the interaction between institutional progress and regulatory environment, 
we extend the basic empirical analysis by allowing the effect of regulation to vary with a 
measure of governance. 
Our empirical analysis also considers the likely endogeneity of the regulatory 
environment.  In particular, economic growth and volatility may shape to some extent the 
type and strength of regulation imposed in a country.  For instance, governments of 
economies subject to external shocks and associated volatility may want to impose labor 
constraints in an attempt to protect domestic employment.  Also, stagnant economic 
growth may prompt governments to increase public infrastructure spending, having to 
                                                 
15 See the appendix for a more detailed description of these components.   13
finance it with a heavier fiscal burden.  Although the regulatory environment is likely to be 
affected by macroeconomic performance, i t is not clear in what direction and to what 
extent.  In order to identify the effect of regulation on macroeconomic performance, we use 
instrumental variables that isolate the exogenous variation in regulation. 
Sample and specification 
Our empirical methodology is based on cross-country regression analysis.  We 
conduct separate regressions for each dependent variable of interest, namely, economic 
growth and macroeconomic volatility.  In each case, we use as explanatory variables a 
measure of regulation and a set of basic control variables.  All variables included in the 
empirical exercises are briefly presented below, except the regulation indices that were 
introduced in the previous section. 
Our sample consists of 74 - 76 countries, depending on the regression exercise.  In 
the largest sample, we have 22 developed and 54 developing countries, of which 21 belong 
to Latin America, 23 to Africa and the Middle East, and 10 to Asia.  Country observations 
for each variable correspond to averages for the 1990s.  We are constrained to this decade 
because internationally comparable regulation measures are available only for this period. 
The dependent variables are defined as follows.  As is standard in the literature, 
economic growth is measured as the average annual rate of per capita real GDP growth.  
Macroeconomic volatility is represented by the standard deviation of the output gap, 
obtained as the difference between actual and trend per capita real GDP.  Trend output is 
estimated using the band-pass filter of Baxter and King (1999). 
As described in the previous section, our explanatory variables of interest are 
indices that quantify a country’s regulatory burden.  We consider, in turn, the overall 
regulation index and its three main components, that is, the product market, labor, and 
fiscal regulation indices.  In an extension to the basic specification, we interact the 
regulation index with a governance proxy,
16 which as already noted is constructed from 
information on experts’ perceptions on public accountability, absence of corruption, and 
rule of law, as reported by the International Country Risk Guide.   
                                                 
16 We don’t include governance as a separate explanatory variable because it is highly collinear with the 
governance-regulation interaction term.  If we did it, we would find that neither governance per se nor 
interacted with regulation is statistically significant.   14
The instrumental variables, used to isolate the exogenous variation in the regulation 
indices, are selected considering the recent literature on the determinants of the regulatory 
environment (see Djankov et al., 2004 and Bolaky and Freund, 2004).  They are the initial 
level of per capita GDP, binary variables that denote legal origin (British, French, German, 
and Nordic), and proxies for the degree of Western influence based on the fraction of the 
population that speaks a major European language. 
Finally, the set of control variables for the growth regressions consists of the initial 
level of per capita real GDP (to account for convergence effects), the initial rate of 
secondary enrollment (as proxy for human capital investment), the initial ratio of private 
domestic credit to GDP (to account for financial depth), and a Sub-Saharan dummy 
variable (to control for the particular conditions of civil conflict, mismanagement, and 
disease affecting this region).
17  The set of control variables for the volatility regressions 
represent the major causes of macroeconomic fluctuations, as identified in the literature.  
They are the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks, a measure of real exchange rate 
overvaluation, and the frequency of systemic banking crisis. 
Results and discussion 
By way of illustration, we show scatter plots that represent the simple relationship 
between the regulation indices and, respectively, economic growth and macroeconomic 
volatility (see Figures 3 and 4).  The graphs using overall regulation consistently suggest 
that more heavily regulated economies tend to experience lower economic growth and 
higher volatility.  Observations reflecting poor macroeconomic performance and high 
overall regulatory burden belong mostly to developing countries, while developed 
economies tend to occupy the other end of the distribution.  The negative link between 
macroeconomic performance and overall regulation seems to be driven by product market 
regulation and, to a lesser extent, labor regulation.  On the other hand, the connection with 
the fiscal burden appears to go in the opposite direction, so that fiscally more regulated 
economies show slightly better performance, although the association is not very strong. 
A more formal evaluation of the link between the regulation indices and the 
measures of macroeconomic performance requires multiple regression analysis, to which 
                                                 
17 The “Africa dummy” has a long tradition in empirical growth studies; see for example Easterly and Levine 
(1997).   15
we turn now.  The regression results are organized as follows.  We first present the results 
of a basic specification where the regulation indices are taken as independent variables and 
their effects as unrelated to governance.  Then, we allow for the effects of regulation on 
macro performance to vary  with the quality of governance.  Finally, keeping the 
regulation-governance interaction, we further control for the likely endogeneity of the 
regulation indices through an instrumental variable procedure. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the basic specification results on economic growth and 
macroeconomic volatility, respectively.  The overall index of regulation has a negative and 
significant association with economic growth, and so do the product market and labor 
regulation indices.  The index of fiscal burden has  no significant link with economic 
growth.  The results on macroeconomic volatility are similar for overall and product 
market regulation: both are positively related to volatility.  Conversely, labor regulation 
has no significant link with macroeconomic volatility, and a heavier fiscal burden even 
appears to be related to lower volatility.  Whereas some of these initial results are 
strengthened in the richer regression specifications discussed next, others change radically 
--such is the case of the negative connection between the fiscal burden and macroeconomic 
volatility. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results when we allow for the effect of 
regulation on growth and volatility to vary with the quality of governance.  In the case of 
economic growth, t he overall, product market, and labor regulation indices all carry 
significantly negative signs and their interaction terms with governance show a positive 
and significant coefficient.  Thus, the negative association of these regulation indices with 
economic growth appears to be mitigated when the quality of governance rises. Indeed, the 
point estimates seem to suggest that at the theoretical maximum level of governance 
quality (equal to one) the impact of product market and labor regulation could even turn 
positive; however, the test results reported in the last row of Tables 5 and 6 cannot reject 
the hypothesis that under such optimal governance the impact of regulation is nil.
18  As for 
the fiscal burden, neither its direct coefficient nor the coefficient on the interaction term is 
statistically significant in the growth regression.  The results on macroeconomic volatility 
                                                 
18 Note that the impact of regulation under the highest level of governance quality is given by the sum of the 
coefficients in the first two rows of the tables.   16
are broadly similar.  The overall, product market, and labor regulation indices carry 
positive and significant coefficients and their corresponding interaction terms with 
governance have negative signs, which are significant for overall and labor regulation.  
Again, this evidence is suggestive that good governance moderates the association between 
heavier regulation and larger volatility.  As before, the fiscal burden appears to behave 
differently from other regulations: Only the interaction term is significant, indicating as 
before that when the quality of governance is high, heavier fiscal regulation is related to 
lower volatility. 
Tables 7 and 8 report the results when we both allow for the governance-regulation 
interaction and control for the likely endogeneity of the regulation indices.  Given that now 
reverse causation is controlled for, the interpretation of the regression coefficients goes 
beyond the mere a ssociation between regulation and the indices of macroeconomic 
performance.  The coefficients can now be interpreted as effects of changes in the 
regulation indices on economic growth and macroeconomic volatility.  All regulation 
indices show a direct negative impact on economic growth, and this impact is statistically 
significant for all except fiscal regulation.  The governance-regulation interaction term 
carries a significantly positive coefficient in all cases.  Therefore, for overall, product 
market, and labor regulation, we find that a larger regulatory burden brings about a 
decrease in growth, but such effect is mitigated by better quality of governance.  In the 
case of fiscal regulation, the estimates are less precise but suggest a potentially beneficial 
impact on growth that drops when the quality of governance quality decreases.  Regarding 
macroeconomic volatility, the direct coefficients on all regulation indices are positive and 
significant, including the elusive one on fiscal regulation.  The interaction term carries a 
negative coefficient for all regulation indices, but it is significantly so only in the cases of 
labor and fiscal regulations.  Taken together, this means that a heavier burden of overall, 
product market, labor or fiscal regulation leads to higher macroeconomic volatility, and 
this harmful effect is mitigated by better governance only in the cases of fiscal and labor 
regulation. 
One potential concern with these results is their sensitivity to outlying observations.  
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that some countries, such as Sierra Leone, are atypical and may be 
having an unduly large influence on the estimated parameters.  To discard the possibility   17
that our results are driven by outliers, we rerun the regressions with the most complete 
specification for growth and volatility (as in Tables 7 and 8) but excluding clearly atypical 
cases.  We use Cook’s ratio as the criterion for exclusion of outliers.  Specifically, we 
exclude the countries whose Cook’s ratio consistently exceeds the threshold of 0.1 in our 
basic regressions.
19  This threshold turns out to be the value below which the influence of 
the vast majority of countries on the estimated parameters becomes very similar to each 
other (see Cook 1979 and Fox 1997).  For growth regressions, the potential outliers are 
Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone; and for volatility regressions, they are Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone.  We find that the regressions results without potential outliers are quite 
similar to the regressions with the original sample.
20  The coefficient signs remain the 
same.  The magnitude of the coefficients change slightly, usually in the direction of 
somewhat smaller regulation effects, but their statistical significance improves as they are 
estimated  more precisely.  Given that excluding potential outliers does not change the 
results in any relevant way, we conduct the rest of the analysis using the parameters 
obtained with the original sample. 
How important are the regulation effects economically?  Using the point estimates 
of the regression that accounts for governance interactions and controls for joint 
endogeneity, we can perform some illustrative exercises.  If a country’s overall index of 
regulation was increased by one standard deviation in the cross-country sample (0.13) and 
its level of governance is equal to the world median (0.44), then its annual rate of per 
capita GDP growth would decrease by 0.4 percentage points.  If a typical developing 
country were to decrease its product market regulation to the median level of industrial 
countries (that is, from 0.51 to 0.17) while maintaining its level of governance (equal to the 
median of developing countries, 0.37), then its annual growth rate would rise by about 1.3 
percentage points.  The point estimates of the coefficients are such that if the quality of 
governance is sufficiently high, an increase in regulation can have a positive impact on 
                                                 
19 We identify the outliers by applying the Cook’s ratio criterion to the OLS regressions only, in accordance 
with theory.  However, once the non-outlier sample is selected, we use it for estimation via instrumental 
variables.   
20 The results on the sample without potential outliers are not presented in the paper but are available upon 
request.   18
growth.
21  For overall, product market, and labor regulations, this threshold level is quite 
high, comparable approximately to the quality of governance in the United States or 
England.  Regarding fiscal regulation, the threshold above which an increase in the fiscal 
burden can have a positive growth impact is smaller and comparable to that of Mexico. 
We can perform similar exercises regarding regulation’s impact on macroeconomic 
volatility.  If a typical (or median) country in the world experiences a one-standard-
deviation increase in the overall index of regulation, its volatility will rise by about 18%.  
If a typical developing country were to decrease its product market regulation to the 
median level of industrial countries, its volatility would fall by about 31%.  These 
calculations use the point estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term, even though 
they are not statistically significant at standard levels for the overall and product market 
regulation indices.  If we were to assume a zero coefficient on the governance-regulation 
interaction term, the corresponding effects would be considerably larger (0.28% and 
0.49%, respectively).  For labor regulation, the threshold level of governance above which 
higher regulation decreases volatility is around the 70
th percentile, comparable to that of 
Korea.  For fiscal regulation, the volatility-increasing effect would disappear only under a 
perfect governance score. 
 
IV.  Concluding remarks 
Regulation is increasingly viewed as a key explanatory factor for the diversity of 
aggregate economic performance across countries.  In this paper we have provided an 
empirical assessment of the macroeconomic impact of regulation in a large sample of 
industrial and developing economies.  For this purpose, we have built a set of synthetic 
regulation indicators encompassing a broad array of regulatory dimensions relevant to 
firms’ economic activity: firm entry, labor, taxation, trade, finance, contract enforcement, 
and bankruptcy. 
These synthetic regulation indicators allow us to characterize the stylized facts 
concerning regulation around the world.  Two main findings emerge in this regard.  First, 
                                                 
21 As noted above, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the impact of regulation on growth (or 
volatility, for that matter) is statistically zero when governance is at its maximum (see the test results 
presented in the last row of Tables 7 and 8).     19
the burden of regulation shows considerable variation across countries, but in ways that 
appear systematically related to countries’ level of development.  Taxes are most heavily 
regulated in rich countries, while in all other areas developing countries show the harshest 
regulatory environments.  Second, the overall regulatory framework can be conveniently 
summarized by the extent of regulation in three major dimensions: fiscal, labor and output 
market, where the latter encompasses the regulation of entry, trade, financial markets, 
bankruptcy and contract enforcement. 
Using this summary representation of the regulatory environment, we have 
assessed empirically the impact of regulation on two key measures of aggregate 
performance, namely the growth rate of GDP per capita and the volatility of the output 
gap.  Our estimations take into account the fact that the quality of regulation is likely to 
vary considerably across countries, reflecting primarily the quality of their overall 
institutional framework.  In addition, we also control for the potential endogeneity of 
regulation, which could itself be driven in part by aggregate economic performance.  This 
allows us to interpret our empirical results as reflecting the causal impact of regulation on 
the macroeconomic variables of interest, rather than just mere association between the 
former and the latter. 
On the whole, our estimates suggest that regulation tends to reduce growth.  This is 
clearly the case for product and labor market regulation.  In the case of fiscal regulation, 
however, the results are less conclusive.  Regarding macroeconomic volatility, our finding 
is that all three kinds of regulation tend to increase it.  However, the quality of regulation – 
as captured by the overall i nstitutional framework – makes a big difference.  In most 
instances we find that better institutions help mitigate, and even eliminate, the adverse 
impact of regulation on macroeconomic performance.  
Does the negative macroeconomic effect of regulations imply that they should be 
eliminated altogether?  As warned in the introduction, this paper does not intend to assess 
the impact of regulation on social goals that could arguably be beyond the sphere of direct 
influence of economic growth – broad goals such as social equity and peace, or narrow 
ones such as worker safety, environmental conservation, and civil security, which typically 
motivate specific regulations.  Thus, our conclusions on the role of regulation must 
necessarily be weighed in a more comprehensive context before drawing definitive social   20
welfare implications.  At any rate, to the extent that economic growth and macroeconomic 
stability are important goals too, our findings imply that streamlining regulation and 
strengthening governance in highly regulated countries could have a significant payoff in 
terms of macroeconomic performance.   21
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Regulation Indices by Region
Indicator No.  Mean Dev. Min Max Indicator No.  Mean Dev. Min Max
Obs. Obs.
Africa East Asia and Pacific
Entry 17 0.42 0.12 0.19 0.68 Entry 6 0.31 0.12 0.17 0.51
Financial Mkt. 17 0.54 0.14 0.32 0.81 Financial Mkt. 6 0.38 0.06 0.27 0.45
Contracts 17 0.63 0.20 0.37 0.99 Contracts 6 0.43 0.10 0.29 0.60
Trade 17 0.72 0.18 0.33 0.94 Trade 6 0.54 0.24 0.34 1.00
Labor 16 0.44 0.18 0.19 0.77 Labor 6 0.37 0.18 0.13 0.54
Fiscal  17 0.50 0.13 0.31 0.75 Fiscal 6 0.41 0.06 0.36 0.50
Bankruptcy 12 0.49 0.15 0.32 0.74 Bankruptcy 5 0.52 0.18 0.28 0.76
Product Mkt. 17 0.57 0.12 0.37 0.77 Product Mkt. 6 0.44 0.08 0.34 0.54
Overall 17 0.54 0.10 0.37 0.70 Overall 6 0.42 0.06 0.34 0.49
OECD Latin America and Caribbean
Entry 22 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.37 Entry 21 0.38 0.12 0.17 0.69
Financial Mkt. 22 0.19 0.13 0.02 0.44 Financial Mkt. 21 0.43 0.18 0.11 0.79
Contracts 22 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.42 Contracts 21 0.65 0.16 0.34 0.93
Trade 22 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.28 Trade 21 0.57 0.17 0.25 0.88
Labor 21 0.44 0.17 0.13 0.78 Labor 21 0.56 0.15 0.26 0.77
Fiscal 22 0.71 0.13 0.39 0.92 Fiscal 21 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.53
Bankruptcy 21 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.68 Bankruptcy 17 0.45 0.14 0.17 0.66
Product Mkt. 22 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.33 Product Mkt. 21 0.50 0.10 0.33 0.77
Overall 22 0.30 0.08 0.16 0.41 Overall 21 0.49 0.08 0.34 0.64
Middle East and North Africa South Asia
Entry 6 0.32 0.07 0.23 0.40 Entry 4 0.33 0.08 0.23 0.40
Financial Mkt. 6 0.58 0.33 0.31 1.00 Financial Mkt. 4 0.46 0.08 0.38 0.54
Contracts 6 0.54 0.11 0.44 0.75 Contracts 4 0.47 0.15 0.26 0.61
Trade 6 0.87 0.12 0.65 1.00 Trade 4 0.80 0.17 0.55 0.96
Labor 6 0.48 0.11 0.34 0.65 Labor 4 0.41 0.06 0.35 0.49
Fiscal 6 0.71 0.13 0.52 0.91 Fiscal 4 0.48 0.12 0.31 0.60
Bankruptcy 6 0.43 0.09 0.34 0.59 Bankruptcy 4 0.36 0.15 0.15 0.48
Product Mkt. 6 0.55 0.08 0.49 0.67 Product Mkt. 4 0.48 0.04 0.42 0.53
Overall 6 0.56 0.06 0.51 0.66 Overall 4 0.47 0.03 0.42 0.50
Source: Authors' estimation  26
 






Trade  Bankruptcy Labor Fiscal
Entry 1
Financial Markets 0.6686* 1
Contract Enforcement 0.6747* 0.6034* 1
Trade  0.6373* 0.7269* 0.6246* 1
Bankruptcy 0.5236* 0.4415* 0.5301* 0.5078* 1
Labor 0.4127* 0.1415 0.4665* 0.0702 0.1413 1
Fiscal -0.5045* -0.2824* -0.5714* -0.3386* -0.3770* -0.1806 1
1st Princ. Comp. 0.8594* 0.7737* 0.8600* 0.8551* 0.7111* 0.2923* -0.5715*
2nd Princ. Comp. 0.1057 -0.3769* 0.1597 -0.2823* -0.0274 0.9007* -0.1069






Fiscal -0.4985* -0.1806 1
Overall 0.9678* 0.4445* -0.3263* 1
1st Princ. Comp. 0.9798* 0.2923* -0.5715* 0.9348*
2nd Princ. Comp. -0.1453 0.9007* -0.1069 -0.0037
3rd Princ. Comp. 0.1131 0.2778* 0.7632* 0.3315*
Source: Authors' estimation
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level.    27
Table 3. Economic Growth and Burden of Regulation: Basic Specification      
Sample: 74-76 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation -7.0246 -6.4351 -2.4154 0.91803
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) -2.71 -3.03 -2.13 0.73
Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -0.7087 -0.8793 -0.2769 -0.3963
  (in logs) -2.54 -2.89 -1.16 -1.53
Initial education 0.6297 0.5427 0.5321 0.6283
  (log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990) 1.41 1.31 1.15 1.20
Initial financial depth 0.4242 0.4229 0.4398 0.6002
  (log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990) 1.29 1.25 1.31 1.65
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.9963 -2.0949 -2.1724 -2.0261
  (1 if country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise) -3.71 -3.88 -3.73 -3.19
Constant 6.6559 7.9526 1.6590 0.0274
3.09 3.40 1.23 0.02
No. of observations 76 76 74 76
R-squared 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.34
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
Source: Authors' estimation
Dependent variable: 
Economic growth: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 1990-2000
Type of regulation index:
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Table 4. Macroeconomic Volatility and Burden of Regulation: Basic Specification      
Sample: 74-75 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation 0.0289 0.0235 0.0093 -0.0112
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) 3.12 3.30 1.03 -1.68
Control Variables:
Volatility of terms of trade shocks 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007
  (standard deviation of annual terms of trade growth) 1.76 1.32 3.37 2.66
Real exchange rate overvaluation -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0005
  (proportional index, where overvaluation if index>100) -0.10 0.20 -0.67 -0.13
Systemic Banking Crises -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0071 -0.0078
  (frequency of years under crisis, ranging from 0 to 1) -1.26 -1.27 -1.31 -1.36
Constant 0.0055 0.0039 0.0213 0.0233
0.31 0.22 1.22 1.37
No. of observations 75 75 74 75
R-squared 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.19
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
Source: Authors' estimation
Dependent variable: 
Macroeconomic Volatility: Standard deviation of the per capita GDP gap, 1990-2000
Type of regulation index:
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Table 5. Economic Growth and Burden of Regulation: Governance Interactions      
Sample: 74-76 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation -9.3448 -9.1654 -5.4898 0.6992
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) -3.28 -3.95 -2.98 0.46
Governance-Regulation interaction 9.0572 9.6752 6.6762 0.3772
  (Governance index * Regulation index) 2.56 3.05 2.68 0.23
  (Gov. index ranges from 0 to 1, higher meaning better governance)
Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -1.0463 -1.0756 -0.6591 -0.4326
  (in logs) -3.37 -3.76 -2.34 -1.30
Initial education 0.6576 0.5290 0.4850 0.6476
  (log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990) 1.67 1.42 1.18 1.27
Initial financial depth 0.4423 0.4525 0.3702 0.5992
  (log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990) 1.27 1.31 1.04 1.63
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.9329 -1.9116 -2.2869 -2.0261
  (1 if country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise) -3.82 -3.83 -4.34 -3.17
Constant 8.3094 8.8403 4.9832 0.2434
3.34 3.46 2.75 0.12
No. of observations 76 76 74 76
R-squared 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.34
P-value of Ho: sum of regulation coefficients = 0 0.47 0.43 0.21 0.24
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
Source: Authors' estimation
Dependent variable: 
Economic growth: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 1990-2000
Type of regulation index:
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Table 6. Macroeconomic Volatility and Burden of Regulation: Governance Interactions      
Sample: 74-75 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation 0.0287 0.0269 0.0203 0.0057
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) 3.12 3.51 2.10 0.58
Governance-Regulation interaction -0.0266 -0.0195 -0.0278 -0.0220
  (Governance index * Regulation index) -1.64 -1.06 -2.92 -2.79
  (Gov. index ranges from 0 to 1, higher meaning better governance)
Control Variables:
Volatility of terms of trade shocks 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005
  (standard deviation of annual terms of trade growth) 1.46 1.22 2.04 1.65
Real exchange rate overvaluation 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0014
  (proportional index, where overvaluation if index>100) 0.11 0.21 -0.08 0.39
Systemic Banking Crises -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0061 -0.0072
  (frequency of years under crisis, ranging from 0 to 1) -1.24 -1.26 -1.15 -1.27
Constant 0.0080 0.00610 0.0146 0.0136
0.43 0.33 0.89 0.83
No. of observations 75 75 74 75
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24
P-value of Ho: sum of regulation coefficients = 0 0.42 0.25 0.21 0.01
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
Source: Authors' estimation
Dependent variable: 
Macroeconomic Volatility: Standard deviation of the per capita GDP gap, 1990-2000
Type of regulation index:
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Sample: 74-76 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Two-Stage Least Squares
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation -6.4438 -6.6855 -4.9030 -2.1200
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) -1.96 -2.46 -2.65 -0.62
Governance-Regulation interaction 7.4199 7.5023 5.6016 5.4742
  (Governance index * Regulation index) 1.82 1.62 2.29 1.79
  (Gov. index ranges from 0 to 1, higher meaning better governance)
Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -0.8667 -0.8847 -0.6013 -0.9258
  (in logs) -3.54 -3.26 -1.96 -2.32
Initial education 0.6893 0.5875 0.5005 0.8919
  (log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990) 1.76 1.56 1.17 1.45
Initial financial depth 0.5106 0.5050 0.3886 0.5809
  (log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990) 1.35 1.36 0.97 1.52
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.9063 -1.8929 -2.2590 -2.0471
  (1 if country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise) -3.93 -3.96 -5.13 -3.10
Constant 5.5900 6.2771 4.3765 3.1969
1.72 1.55 2.56 1.73
No. of observations 76 76 74 76
R-squared 0.47 0.51 0.49 0.2993
R-squared 1st stage (partial due to excluded instruments) 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.22
Hansen's J-test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value): 0.44 0.69 0.42 0.25
P-value of Ho: sum of regulation plus regulation*governance coefficients = 0 0.44 0.45 0.40 0.05
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
    
Source: Authors' estimation
Table 7. Economic Growth and Burden of Regulation: Accounting for endogeneity and governance interactions
c) Instruments for regulation and interaction: log of per capita GDP in 1990, binary variable of legal origin (British,French, German, Nordic), variables 
indicating fraction of population that speaks a major European language, and governance index.
Dependent variable: 
Economic growth: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 1990-2000
Type of regulation index:
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
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Sample: 74-75 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Two-Stage Least Squares
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation 0.0306 0.0275 0.0184 0.0355
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) 2.75 3.48 1.66 1.83
Governance-Regulation interaction -0.0249 -0.0271 -0.0292 -0.0354
  (Governance index * Regulation index) -1.51 -1.35 -3.11 -2.91
  (Gov. index ranges from 0 to 1, higher meaning better governance)
Control Variables:
Volatility of terms of trade shocks 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005
  (standard deviation of annual terms of trade growth) 1.34 1.17 2.00 1.78
Real exchange rate overvaluation 0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001
  (proportional index, where overvaluation if index>100) 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.03
Systemic Banking Crises -0.0066 -0.0069 -0.0061 -0.0059
  (frequency of years under crisis, ranging from 0 to 1) -1.28 -1.31 -1.19 -1.05
Constant 0.0067 0.0075 0.0146 0.0072
0.39 0.43 0.93 0.43
No. of observations 75 75 74 75
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.15
R-squared 1st stage (partial due to excluded instruments) 0.75 0.78 0.47 0.37
Hansen's J-test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value): 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.36
P-value of Ho: sum of regulation plus regulation*governance coefficients = 0 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.46
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
    
Source: Authors' estimation
Table 8. Macroeconomic Volatility and Burden of Regulation: Accounting for endogeneity and governance interactions    
c) Instruments for regulation and interaction: log of per capita GDP in 1990, binary variables of legal origin (British,French, German, Nordic), variables 
indicating fraction of population that speaks a major European language, and governance index.
Dependent variable: 
Macroeconomic Volatility: Standard deviation of the per capita GDP gap, 1990-2000
Type of regulation index:
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
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Note: AFR: Africa region, EAP: East Asia and Pacific region, INL: OECD, LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean 
region, MNA: Middle East and North Africa region, SAS: South Asia region 
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Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
   36
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   37
Appendix: Sources and Description of the Regulation Indices’ Components 
ENTRY           
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 




Actual number  The number of different procedures that a start-up has to 
comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e.  to start 
operating as a legal entity.  The data cover (1) procedures 
that are always required; (2) procedures that are generally 
required but that can be avoided in exceptional cases or for 






Doing Business, The World Bank Group 
see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
"The Regulation of Entry", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117, 1-37, Feb.  2002. 
http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness 
 
Number of days 
(db_entry_days) 
Actual number  Time recorded in calendar days.  It is assumed that the 
minimum time required to fulfill a procedural requirement is 
one day.  The variable measures the average duration 
estimated necessary to complete a procedure.  The fastest 
procedure (independent of cost) is chosen.  It is assumed 
that the entrepreneur completes the procedure in the most 
efficient way, ignoring the time that the entrepreneur spends 
in information gathering. 
   
Cost 
(db_entry_cost) 
% GNI  Costs associated with starting-up a business, based on the 
texts of the Company Law, the Commercial Code, or 
specific regulations.  If there are conflicting sources and the 
laws are not completely clear, the most authoritative source 
is used.  If the sources have the same rank the source 
indicating the most costly procedure is used.  In the 
absence of express legal fee schedules, a governmental 
officer’s estimate is taken as an official source.  If several 
sources have different estimates, the median reported value 
is used.  In the absence of government officer's estimates, 
estimates of incorporation lawyers are used instead.  If 
these differ, the median reported value is computed.  In all 
cases, the cost estimate excludes bribes. 
   
1  Very low  Existing regulations straightforward and applied uniformly to 
all businesses; regulations not much of a burden for 






2  Low   Simple licensing procedures; existing regulations relatively 
straightforward and applied uniformly most of the time, but 
burdensome in some instances; corruption possible but rare 
 
The Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation 
Based on: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Commerce and Country Report, 2001 and 2002, U.S.  
Department of State, Country Commercial Guide 24 and 
Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices 
for 2000, Office of the U.S.  Trade Representative, 2002 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers, and official government publications of each 
country.   38
3  Moderate  Complicated licensing procedure; regulations impose 
substantial burden on business; existing regulations may be 
applied haphazardly and in some instances are not even 
published by the government; corruption may be present 
and poses minor burden on businesses 
  http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.html 
4  High  Government-set production quotas and some state 
planning; major barriers to opening a business; complicated 
licensing process; very high fees; bribes sometimes 
necessary; corruption present and burdensome; regulations 
impose a great burden on business 
   
 
5  Very high  Government impedes the creation of new businesses; 
corruption rampant; regulations applied randomly 
   
           
TRADE           
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 
Scale  Description  Years  Source 
Trade 
(ief_trade) 
1  Very low  Weighted average tariff rate less than or equal to 4 percent.  1995-
2003 
(annual) 
The Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation 
  2  Low   Weighted average tariff rate greater than 4 percent but less 
than or equal to 9 percent 
 
  3  Moderate  Weighted average tariff rate greater than 9 percent but less 
than or equal to 14 percent 
 
  4  High  Weighted average tariff rate greater than 14 percent but 
less than or equal to 19 percent 
 
  5  Very high  Weighted average tariff rate greater than 19 percent.   
Based on: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report and Country Commerce, 2002; International 
Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
and International Financial Statistics on CD–ROM, 2002; 
Office of the U.S.  Trade Representative, 2002 National 
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers; U.S.  
Department of State, Country Commercial Guide 3 and 
Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices 
for 2001 and 2002; World Bank, W orld Development 
Indicators 2002; World Trade Organization, Trade Policy 
Reviews, 1995 to June 2001; and official government 
publications of each country.  For all the European Union 
countries, the authors have based the score on data 
reported by the World Bank. 
i Hidden import 
barriers 
(efw_bi)  
0  to 10  (0= heavy 
regulation) 
No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas.  Economic Freedom of the World, The Fraser Institute 
 
From Section: 
ii Costs of importing 
(efw_bii) 
    The combined effect of import tariffs, license fees, bank 




4 Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners  
B.  Regulatory Trade Barriers   39
      raises costs of importing equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 
= more than 50%).  This component is based on survey 
responses to this question obtained from the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2000.   
  Based on: World Economic Forum (2001),  Global 
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.  
Press). 
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html 
           
FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
         
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 
Scale  Description  Years  Source 
0  to 10  (0= heavy 
regulation) 
Economic Freedom of the World, The Fraser Institute 
 
From Section: 
    5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
iv.  Avoidance of 
interest rate controls 
and regulations that 
lead to negative real 
interest rates 
(efw_aiv) 





A.  Credit Market Regulations 
     
Data on credit-market controls and regulations were used to 
construct rating intervals.  Countries with interest rates 
determined by the market,  stable monetary policy, and 
positive real deposit and lending rates received higher 
ratings.  When interest rates were determined primarily by 
market forces and the real rates were positive, countries 
were given a rating of 10.  When interest rates were 
primarily market-determined but the real rates were 
sometimes slightly negative (less than 5%) or the differential 
between the deposit and lending rates was large (8% or 
more), countries received a rating of 8.  When the real 
deposit or lending rate was persistently negative by a 
single-digit amount or the differential between them was 
regulated by the government, countries were rated at 6.  
When the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the 
government and the real rates were often negative by 
single-digit amounts, countries were assigned a rating of 4.  
When the real deposit or lending rate was persistently 
negative by a double-digit amount, countries received a 
rating of 2.  A zero rating was assigned when the deposit 
and lending rates were fixed by the government and real 
rates were persistently negative by double-digit amounts or 
hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit market. 
  Based on: International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues, as well as 
the monthly supplements) 
v.  Interest rate 
controls 
(efw_av) 
    Reflects whether interest rate controls on bank deposits 
and/or loans are freely determined by the market. 
  Based on data provided by the World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report. 
1  Very low  Government involvement in the financial sector negligible; 
very few restrictions on foreign financial institutions; banks 




The Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation  Banking and finance 
(ief_banking) 
2  Low   Government involvement in the financial sector minimal; few 
limits on foreign banks; country may maintain some limits on 
financial services; domestic bank formation may face some 
barriers 
  Based on: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Commerce, Country Profile, and Country Report for 2001 
and 2002; U.S.  Department of State, Country Commercial   40
3  Moderate  Substantial government influence on b anks; government 
owns or controls some banks; government controls credit; 
domestic bank formation may face significant barriers 
 
4  High  Heavy government involvement in the financial sector; 
banking system in transition; banks tightly controlled by 




5  Very high  Financial institutions in chaos; banks operate on primitive 
basis; most credit controlled by government and goes only 
to state-owned enterprises; corruption rampant 
 
Guide 19 ; U.S.  Department of State, Country Reports on 
Economic Policy and Trade Practices for 2001; and official 
government publications of each country. 
           
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT         
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 




Actual number  Number of procedures mandated by law or court regulation 
that demands interaction between the parties or between 
them and the judge or court officer.  The questionnaire 
covers the step-by-step evolution of a debt recovery case 






Doing Business, The World Bank Group. 
See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "Courts", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, May 2003. 
Bureaucracy quality 
(icrg_bureau) 
0 to 4  High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy 
has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services.  
Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong 
bureaucracy receive low points because a change in 
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy 
formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. 
1990-
2000 
International Country Risk Guide - PRS Group 
http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html 
 
           
FISCAL 
REGULATION 
         
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 
Scale  Description  Years  Source 
    Individual Income Tax Grading Scale  Fiscal burden 
(ief_taxation) 
1  Very low  Top income tax rate 0 percent.  Marginal rate for the 




The Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage 
Foundation   41
  2  Low   Top income tax rate greater than 0 percent and less than or 
equal to 25 percent.  Marginal rate for the average taxpayer 
greater than 0 percent and less than or equal to 10 percent 
  Based on: Ernst & Young, 2002 The Global Executive and 
2002 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide; International 
  3  Moderate  Top income tax rate greater than 25 percent and less than 
or equal to 35 percent.  Marginal rate for the average 
taxpayer greater than 10 percent and less than or equal to 
15 percent. 
 
  4  High  Top income tax rate greater than 35 percent and less than 
or equal to 50 percent.  Marginal rate for the average 
taxpayer greater than 15 percent and less than or equal to 
20 percent. 
 
  5  Very high  Top income tax rate greater than 50 percent.  Marginal rate 
for the average taxpayer greater than 20 percent 
 
      Corporate Tax Grading Scale   
  1  Very low  Corporate tax rate less than or equal to 20 percent   
  2  Low   Corporate tax rate greater than 20 percent and less than or 
equal to 25 percent. 
 
  3  Moderate  Corporate tax rate greater than 25 percent and less than or 
equal to 35 percent. 
 
  4  High  Corporate tax rate greater than 35 percent and less than or 
equal to 45 percent. 
 
  5  Very high  Corporate tax rate greater than 45 percent.   
      Government Expenditures Scale for Developed Countries   
  1  Very low  Less than or equal to 15 percent.   
  2  Low   Greater than 15 percent but less than or equal to 25 percent   
  3  Moderate  Greater than 25 percent but less than or equal to 35 percent   
  4  High  Greater than 35 percent but less than or equal to 45 percent   
  5  Very high  Greater than 45 percent   
      Government Expenditures Scale for Developing Countries   
  1  Very low  Less than or equal to 15 percent   
  2  Low   Greater than 15 percent but less than or equal t o 20 
percent. 
 
Monetary Fund Staff Country Report, Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix, 2000 to 2002; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Commerce, Country Profile, and Country 
Report for 2001 and 2002; U.S.  Department of State, 
Country Commercial Guide 9 ; and official government 
publications of each country.  Sources other than Ernst & 
Young are noted in the text.  For information on 
government expenditures, the authors’ primary sources 
were Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development data (for member countries); International 
Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
for 2001, and International Monetary Fund Staff Country 
Report, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 2000 to 
2002; Standard & Poor’s, Sovereigns Ratings Analysis; 
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing 
Asian and Pacific Countries 2001; African  Development 
Bank, ADB Statistics Pocketbook 2002; European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development,  Country Strategies; 
Inter-American Development Bank; U.S.  Department of 
State, Country Commercial Guide 10 ; and official 
government publications of each country.  Sources other 
than the OECD and the IMF are noted in the text. 
  3  Moderate  Greater than 20 percent but less than or equal to 25 percent     
  4  High  Greater than 25 percent but less than or equal to 30 percent     
  5  Very high  Greater than 30 percent       42
Corporate tax % 
(kpmg_tax) 
%  Corporate tax rate.  The above rates do not reflect payroll 
taxes, social security taxes, net wealth taxes, turnover/sales 




Corporate Tax Rates Survey, KPMG, Switzerland 
      When 2 or more rates are reported, the highest number is 
chosen. 
  The survey (begun in 1993) currently covers 68 countries, 
including the 30 member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
many countries in the Asia Pacific and Latin America 
regions.  Local KPMG tax offices from these countries 
have contributed to this survey. 
1D  Top marginal tax 
rate 
(efw_d) 
  0 to 10  Average of 1.D.i.  Top Marginal Income Tax Rate and 1.D.ii.  
Top Marginal Income and Payroll Tax Rate 
Economic Freedom of the World, The Fraser Institute 
 
From Section: 
      1: Size of government 
     
Countries with higher marginal tax rates that take effect at 
lower income thresholds received lower ratings.  The 
income threshold data were converted from local currency 
to 1982/1984 US dollars (using beginning-of-year exchange 





Based on: Price Waterhouse, Individual Taxes: A 
Worldwide Summary (various issues) 
           
LABOR           
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 
Scale  Description  Years  Source 
TUMMBR 
(ra_union) 
%  A Database of Labor-Market Indicators Across 
Countries 
     
Total trade union membership, in percent of the total labor 
force.  Includes workers of both sexes in the public and the 
private sectors.  In some countries, the union membership 
may include unemployed and retired workers who pay their 
dues.  Based on the number of active contributors declared 
by the trade unions themselves and on labor force 
estimates.  When declared membership is larger than the 








0 to 100, higher values 
indicating more rigid 
regulation 




0 to 100, higher values 
indicating more rigid 
regulation 
Working time requirements, including mandatory minimum 
daily rest, maximum number of hours in a normal workweek, 
premium for overtime work, restrictions on weekly holiday, 
mandatory payment for nonworking days, (which includes 
days of annual leave with pay and paid time off for 
holidays), and minimum wage legislation.  The constitutional 
principles dealing with the minimum conditions of 






Doing Business, The World Bank 
see Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, "The Regulation of Labor", Working Paper 9756, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2003  
Based on: NATLEX database (International Labour 
Organization); Constitutions, available online on the U.S.  
Law Library of Congress website; International 
Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
and Social Security Programs Throughout the World.  
Legal advice from leading local law firms was solicited to 
confirm accuracy in all cases.  Following the OECD Job 




0 to 100, higher values 
indicating more rigid 
regulation 
Workers' legal protections against dismissal, including 
grounds for dismissal, procedures for dismissal (individual 
and collective), notice period, and severance payment.  The 
constitutional principles dealing with protection against 
dismissal are also coded. 
  and Industrial Relations, the areas subject to statutory 
regulation in all countries were identified.  Those include 
hiring of workers, conditions of employment, and firing of 
workers 
           
BANKRUPTCY           
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
(name in our 
database) 




0 to 100  The measure documents the success in reaching the three 
goals of insolvency, as stated in Hart (1999).  It is calculated 
as the simple average of the cost of insolvency (rescaled 
from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate less cost), time 
of insolvency (rescaled from 0 to 100, where higher scores 
indicate less time), the observance of absolute priority of 
claims, and the efficient outcome achieved.  A score 100 on 
the index means perfect efficiency. 
2003  Doing Business, The World Bank 
See Djankov, Simeon, Oliver Hart, Tatiana Nenova, and 
Andrei Shleifer, "Efficiency in Bankruptcy", working paper, 
Department of Economics, Harvard University, July 2003. 
Cost measure 
(db_close_cost) 
%  Cost is defined as the cost of the entire bankruptcy process, 
including court costs, insolvency practitioners' costs, the 
cost of independent assessors, lawyers, accountants, etc.  
In all cases, the cost estimate excludes bribes.  The cost 
figures are averages of the estimates in a multiple-choice 
question, where the respondents choose among the 
following options: 0-2 percent, 3-5 percent, 6-10 percent, 
11-25 percent, 26-50 percent, and more than 50 percent of 
the insolvency estate value. 
2003   
Court-powers index 
(db_close_court) 
0 to 100  The measure documents the degree to which the court 
drives insolvency proceedings.  It is an average of three 
indicators: whether the court appoints and replaces the 
insolvency administrator with no restrictions imposed by 
law, whether the reports of the administrator are accessible 
only to the court and not creditors, and whether the court 
decides on the adoption of the rehabilitation plan.  The 
index is scaled from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate 
more court involvement in the insolvency process.   
2003   
           
GOVERNANCE           
Variable name in 
corresponding 
database 
Scale  Description  Years  Source   44
(name in our 
database) 
       
Corruption 
(icrg_corrup) 
0 to 6  This is an assessment of corruption within the political 
system.  The most common form of corruption met directly 
by business is financial corruption in the form of demands 
for special payments and bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police 
protection, or loans.  Although our measure takes such 
corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or 
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job  reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party 




International Country Risk Guide, PRS Group 
Law and order 
(icrg_laworder)  
0 to 6  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-
component is an assessment of popular observance of the 
law.  Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms 
of its judicial system, but a low rating  - 1 – if it suffers from 
a very high crime rate of if the law is routinely ignored 
without effective sanction. 




0 to 6  Measure of the government's responsiveness to the people.  
The score depends on the type of regime: Alternating 
Democracy, Dominated Democracy, De-facto One-party 
State, or De-jure One-party State.  Higher points are given 
to Alternating Democracies (see ICRG for details). 
   
           
Index on Regulatory Burden 
  Components  Method     
  ENTRY     
  TRADE    We apply the following standardization formula to each component described above:  
  FINANCIAL MARKETS            (Xi-Xmin)/ (Xmax-Xmin) if higher values indicate heavier regulation and  
  CONTRACT 
ENFORCEMENT 
          (Xmax-Xi)/ (Xmax-Xmin) if lower values indicate heavier regulation.   
  BANKRUPTCY  Therefore, all values are distributed between 0 and 1, with higher values denoting heavier regulation. 
  LABOR REGULATION    
  FISCAL BURDEN  Next we take the simple average of the components in each category to get the corresponding partial indicator.  The overall index on 
regulatory burden is the simple average of the partial indicators. 
 